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In this paper  we estimate  the stock  of flight  capital  held  abroad,  and compare  it with  the stock  of real
(non-financial)  capital  held  within a country.  This is of interest  for two reasons.
At the aggregate  level, many of the problems  commonly  associated  with capital  flight are more
closely associated  with large proportions  of real wealth held abroad  than with the magnitude of
annual  outflows.  First, there  are large differences  in the shares  of wealth  held abroad.  In the regions
with the most severe capital flight, the phenomenon  has cumulatively  accounted for a major
reduction  in the real capital  stock  per worker,  with concomitant  effects  upon income. Second,  the
concern  that capital  flight erodes  the domestic  tax base is more specifically  an argument  that  a large
share of private wealth  held abroad  reduces  the domestic  tax base. Third, the potential  for capital
flight repatriation  depends  on the share  of wealth  held abroad  and how changes  in policies  affect
expectations  of risk-adjusted  returns such  that desired  portfolio  allocations  change.
At the level of the individual  agent,  wealth  held abroad,  like the decision  to hold any other asset,
reflects a portfolio  choice.  Typically,  the decision  as to how  much of a particular  asset to hold will
be determined  both by the relative  attraction  of the asset,  and by the amount  of wealth.  Similarly,
the amount  of wealth  held abroad  will be determiined  both by the relative  attractions  of domestic  and
foreign assets, and by the overall endowment  of wealth. To date, however,  empirical studies of
capital flight have usually  not analysed  it as reflecting  the choice  of a stock of foreign  assets held
as part of a stock  of wealth.  Instead,  they  have focused  on the annual  flow.  This has not reflected  a
mistake of specification,  but rather a lack of data on stocks,  both of capital flight and of overall
private wealth.  The one exception  is Cline (1995)  who estimates  the stock  of flight capital  for six
Latin American  countries  and the Philippines,  and then compares  it with the stock  of some liquid
domestic  financial  assets.  The innovation  of this paper is to build estimates  of the stock  of private
flight capital  and the stock  of total private  real wealth  for 51 countries.  These stocks  are combined
to estimate the proportion  of total real wealth  which is held abroad. This portfolio choice then
becomes  the dependent  variable  which we explain in terms of national endowments  and national
policies.
Section  2 discusses  the data and  presents  descriptive  statistics  on portfolio  choices  by region.  Section
3 reviews the literature  on capital flight and sets out a framework  for analyzing  flight capital as
portfolio  choice.  In Section  4 we test the framework,  using  data  for the period 1970-90,  and  establish
the determinants  of portfolio  choice.  In Section  5 we develop  four  applications.  First,  we investigate
the impact  of the deterioration  in East  Asian  risk  ratings  following  the recent  currency  crises,  on East
Asian portfolio  choices.  Secondly,  we investigate  whether  there is evidence  for spillovers,  that is,
whether as capital flight increases, the incentives for further flight also increase. Thirdly, we
investigate the effect of the Heavily Indebted  Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative on
portfolio  choices:  to what extent  will forgiveness  of public  debts  induce  private  capital  repatriation?
Finally,  we investigate  why  Africa  has had so much  capital  flight  relative  to other  continents.  Section
6 concludes.
12.  Portfolio Choices by Region
The estimation of portfolio choices requires comparable measures of the stock of flight capital and
the stock of private wealth. We discuss these two measures in turn and then aggregate them at the
regional level.
Measuring the Stock of Flight Capital
The measurement of capital flight as a flow involves a number of choices which have been well
discussed  in the  literature (see, in particular, Claessens and Naude,(1993)).'  The World Bank
calculates capital flight using a variant of the residual method, in which outward capital flight occurs
when sources of funds exceed uses of funds. Sources of funds include all net official inflows and the
net flow of foreign direct investment, and uses of funds include the current-account deficit and
additions to reserves. 2 In our estimation of stocks we take the World Bank estimate of flows as our
starting point. However, this series estimates capital flight only from the capital account of the
balance of payments and omits any capital flight through mis-invoicing of trade. We add trade-mis-
invoicing to the World Bank figures. A second departure from the World Bank concept of capital
flight is that we do not deduct private non-guaranteed debt. That is, our concept is of gross rather
than net private  assets. The rationale for this is that behaviorally, the existence of claims  and
offsetting liabilities is not equivalent to the absence of claims, partly because the claims and the
liabilities will generally not refer to the same agents.
To convert these flows into stocks requires an assumption as to the rate of return. We apply the
interest rate on US Treasury Bills. A second problem is that the net flow of apparent flight capital
is sometimes negative. This  can arise for two  reasons. First, previous  flight capital miight be
repatriated. Secondly, agents might borrow internationally. Clearly, this second phenomLenon  is
conceptually distinct from capital repatriation and needs to be distinguished from it empirically.
Following the World Bank methodology, we treat all the stocks of flight capital as being zero at the
start of our period of observation, 1970. However, following Cline (1995) we count the stock of
flight capital as becoming positive in the first year in which the flow of capital flight becomes
positive. In effect, we treat early years of negative flows as the accumulation of debts which are not
reduced by subsequent capital flight. Our flight capital stocks are thus gross of indebtedness. If flows
subsequently turn negative we treat this as the repatriation of capital. In this we slightly depart from
Cline, who assumes that only half of the flow is repatriation, the other half being foreign investment
i Claessens  and Naude (1993) present  estimates  of capital flight using the four most common  approaches:  (1) the
residual  approach  (used  by the World  Bank,  Morgan  Guaranty  and  Cline);  (2)  measuring  the stock  of unreported  assets
(Dooley's  method);  (3)  hot money  measures  (Cuddington);  (4) and  measuring  trade mis-invoicing.  The flows we term
World Bank estimates are the authors' variant of the World Bank measure. They show that although the Dooley and
residual measures differ greatly in conceptual approach, a Dooley measure of the flow of capital flight can also be
obtained using a residual method. In Section 5 we show that our results are robust to calculating our capital flight stocks
using the different measures of capital flight.
2Most  of the data comes from the balance-of-payments. For net official extemal borrowing, however, World Bank debt
data is used, since it is likely to be more accurate.
2(p.441). Since foreign investor capital inflows are separately, and generally fairly accurately,
recorded in the balance of payments, this adjustment by Cline appears unwarranted. Although we
thus count negative net capital outflows as capital repatriation, we do not allow the stock of flight
capital to fall below zero, consistent with our distinction between capital repatriation and foreign
borrowing. Hence, a country which had an annual net flow during the first five years of  -3, -4, +3,
-1, -5 would, on our measure, have a stock of flight capital in each of these years (before allowing
for interest) of 0, 0, 3, 2, 0.
The flight  capital stocks are converted to real  1985 US  dollars in order to  make the figures
comparable to our private capital stock measures.
Measuring the Stock of Private Wealth
We measure the stock of private wealth as the sum of flight capital as measured above, the private
real capital stock, and quasi-money. In order to measure the real private capital stock we first
obtained a measure of the aggregate capital stock from the flows of past investment. For this we
followed the method of King and Levine (1994). We estimated the initial capital stock for 1960 and
used the perpetual inventory method to obtain annual values for the capital stock 1960-1990 (see
data  appendix). 3 We then  disaggregated this  total  capital  stock  into  its  public  and  private
components. The starting point is the public investment data from Easterly and Rebelo (1993) which
we combine with World Bank data on gross domestic investment to calculate private investment.
We adjust the public and private investment shares to be comparable to PWT data by using the ratio
of gross domestic investment in domestic currency in 1985 to PPP-adjusted investment in 1985.
We work with two concepts of private wealth. The first is private real wealth, which is the sum of
the private real capital stock and the stock of flight capital. At the aggregate level it is the allocation
of private wealth between these two components which is important for income and growth. The
second is private total wealth, which is the sum of private real wealth and quasi-money. Quasi-
money is only one component of the financial wealth of private agents, however, it is the only one
for which satisfactory data could be obtained for a reasonable sample of countries. It should be noted
that important components are omitted, notably domestic bonds and pension claims.
Flight capital Portfolio Choices by Region
The descriptive statistics are summarised for each region in Table 1. Since the Table includes only
51 countries, no region is covered comprehensively. The most complete data is for Sub-Saharan
Africa, for which 22 countries are included. For each region, the figures of capital (and real wealth)
per worker are the sum of the capital (wealth) over the countries covered, divided by the sum of the
workforce in the same countries. Similarly, the flight capital ratio is the sum of flight capital for the
region, divided by the sum of private real wealth.
3 Although  there are some existing  capital  stock  measures  available,  using  the King and Levine  method  allowed  us to
calculate  capital  stocks  for a larger  number  of countries  and an extended  time  period.
3The table shows four striking results. First, the differences between regions in private capital per
worker are far larger than those in public capital. Secondly, by 1990 Africa was remarkably short
of private capital, both absolutely, and relative to public capital. In absolute terms it had less than
one half that of South Asia, the next most capital-scarce region. In relative terms, it was the only
region which had more public capital per worker than private capital. Thirdly, and most remarkably,
Africa had the highest incidence of capital flight. Despite its capital scarcity, it slightly exceeded
even the Middle East in the high proportion of private wealth held abroad: 39% of private portfolios
were  -held outside the continent. Were Africa able to attract back this component of private wealth,
the private capital stock would increase by around 64%. Fourtily,  East Asia had a  very  low
proportion of private portfolios held abroad, despite having quite a high level of private wealth. In
view of the recent capital flight from the region this is of some interest, suggesting that before the
crisis East Asian wealth holders were unusual in the extent to which they retained their wealth
domestically.
Table 1: Private  Wealth  and its Composition  by Region,  1990 (1985 US$)
Region  Public  capital  Private  wealth  Private capital  Capital flight  Capital
per worker  per worker  per worker  per worker  flight ratio
SS Africa  1,271  1,752  1,069  683  0.39
L.America  6,653  19,361  17,424  1,936  0.10
SouthAsia  2,135  2,500  2,425  75  0.03
East Asia  3,878  10,331  9,711  620  0.06
Middle-  8,693  6,030  3,678  2,352  0.39
East
3. Modelling Capital Flight
Models of Capital Flight in the Literature
Although the view of capital flight as part of a portfolio allocation decision is implicit in much of
the theoretical and empirical literature, it is not been investigated explicitly. Empirical models have
analyzed the determinants of the flows of capital flight, not capital flight as a share of wealth. Based
on portfolio considerations, however, the models often include interest differentials in explaining
capital flight flows .Theories have focused on tax and tax-like distortions that lower returns and add
risk to domestic financial and physical assets, leading to capital flight, and how often these risks are
related to foreign borrowing. Our starting point is a standard portfolio model which Sheets (1995)
presents as applicable to the capital flight decision (see Appendix A). Capital flight arises from
4portfolio diversification  incentives,  return differential  incentives  and relative risk incentives.  Is
capital  flight explicable  in the same  manner  as say, allocating  a portfolio  across  domestic  bonds  and
equities,  i.e. in terms of a standard  portfolio  model?  It is likely  that the standard  model  will need to
be modified  and broadened.  We review  theories  of capital  flight below  in order  to determine  what
special features would need to be added to a standard  portfolio choice problem to reflect the
particulars  of allocating  wealth  to capital  flight and domestic  investment.
In one of the first theoretical  models,  Khan and Haque  (1985) show that two-way  capital flows,
private capital  flight occurrng simultaneously  with private  foreign  borrowing,  can arise in a model
where  domestic  and foreign  investors  face  an asymmetric  risk of expropriation. 4 Domestic  investors
face a higher risk of expropriation,  so they  invest  abroad,  and domestic  investment  is consequently
financed  with foreign  funds. Dooley (1988) also focuses  on the notion that domestic  and foreign
investors face asymmetric  risk, but broadens  the source  of the risk to the wide range of implicit
taxes, generated,  by say a rapid inflation  or exchange  rate  depreciation.  A fiscal  shock  may lead  the
government  to increased  reliance  on the inflation  tax, which  erodes  the value of domestic  financial
assets and leads residents  to acquire  foreign  assets.  Foreign  investors  could  be attracted  by the fall
in prices (increase  in yields), as domestic  residents  liquidate  their domestic  securities.  Foreigners
face less risks because  they are often  able  to get claims  denominated  in foreign  currency,  and  these
have explicit  or implicit  government  guarantees.
The capital  flight literature  has built on these  early  theoretical  models,  extending  them in essentially
three directions.  First, the risk of expropriation  has been generalized  to risks of high taxation and
related  to large  foreign  borrowing.  In most of these  models  capital  flight  is subject  to contagion5--as
more capital flees, the expected  per capita  tax liability  increases  and heightens  the incentives  for
further capital flight. Second, political economy models have endogenized  the reasons why
governments  may  levy  punitively  high and variable  taxes  on domestic  assets.  Third,  public  finance
models  have  focused  on the effects  of capital  income  taxation  that varies  de  facto by residence  and
source, explaining  capital  flight and domestic  investment  financed  with foreign  borrowing.
We will focus on the first category  of models,  since  they  have implications  for empirical  work, and
briefly  mention  the other categories.  In Eaton (1987),  the expectation  of increased  tax obligations
created  by the potential  nationalization  of private  debt  generates  capital  flight.  In his simplest  model,
private borrowers can invest their own and borrowed funds abroad, where they earn less than
domestic  investment  projects.  But the borrower  escapes  the obligation  to repay  the loan  or pay taxes.
Potential nationalization  of private debt implies  that the flight of the capital  of any one borrower
increases the tax obligations of  remaining borrowers. In  one equilibrium borrowers invest
4Much of the literature has been concemed with explaining two-way capital flows, private capital flight occurring
simultaneously with private or public foreign borrowing. This phenomenon is not easy to rationalize within standard
theoretical models of optimal borrowing decisions. Although this issue is not important for our inquiry, we will be
interested in the nature of the causal relationship  between foreign borrowing and capital flight. The issue of rationalizing
two-way capital flows is thus a prior question to causality, i.e. why do foreign borrowing and capital flight even occur
at the same time?
'In  our empirical application we will use the term spillovers rather than contagion, to avoid confusion with the
usage of contagion to refer to cross-country effects.
5domestically and loans are repaid, while in another there is capital flight and default on foreign
loans. Eaton and Gersovitz (1989) analyze a similar type of capital flight contagion generated by
anticipated tax obligations when the government borrows abroad to finance public goods. In a
macroeconomic model, Ize and Ortiz (1987) also show that when fiscal rigidities create difficulties
for servicing foreign debt, private capital flight is encouraged by foreign borrowing since there is
an expectation of higher domestic asset taxation in order to service future debt.
Capital flight in Schineller's  (1993) model is subject to a similar type of contagion, but it is not
related to  foreign debt. Returns to the domestic  asset are stochastic because of political  risk.
Government taxes domestic returns in order to finance a given expenditure requirement, and so the
per capita tax rate is endogenous, and depends on the number of investors who do not flee to the
foreign asset. When transactions costs to changing the investment  position are added, there is a range
of inaction where capital flight will not be repatriated, even though the expected domestic returns
are favourable.
Another type of capital flight model has explored why domestic agents face high and uncertain risks
of explicit and implicit taxation of domestic assets. Alesina and Tabellini (1989) consider a model
in which different government types with conflicting distributional goals randomly alternate in
office. The uncertainty over future fiscal policies leads simultaneously  to capital flight, low domestic
investment, and the occurrence of large external debts. The over-borrowing occurs since the current
government does not fully internalize the future costs of servicing the debt. In Tornell and Velasco
(1992), the government is the clearing house of interests of various groups, and confiscatory policies
are the outcome of the interest group game. If different groups have the ability to extract transfers
from government each groups effectively has common access to the others capital stocks. Capital
flight offers an asset that may have a lower return, but its return can be privately appropriated.
Finally, examples of capital flight models that focus on the different tax treatments for resident and
nonresident holders of domestic assets include Dooley and Kletzer (1994) and Razin (1991).
The nature of the foreign debt-capital flight relationship has been controversial both in the literature
and for international lenders and country governments. In the models discussed above, two different
types of causal linkages have been considered. In Eaton's model, the inflow of foreign resources
provides both the resources and a possible motive for capital flight. Boyce (1992) calls this debt-
fueled capital flight, as distinguished from debt-motivated capital flight that was the focus of some
other models. The models above that considered debt-motivated  capital flight focused on the channel
through which high levels of foreign debt created expectations of heavy future asset taxation. It is
also possible that there is no causal relationship between foreign debt and capital flight, but rather
an indirect linkage. In Alesina and Tabellini, for example, uncertainty about the type of future
government generates capital flight, large foreign debts and low domestic investment. 6
Finally, it may be that the causality runs in the other direction, from capital flight to foreign debt.
Boyce distinguishes flight-driven external borrowing from flight-fueled external borrowing. In the
6  Another example of an indirect linkage is Blejer and Ize (1989). uncertainty over adjustment efforts leads to both
capital flight, low investment, and the sudden withdrawal of new foreign financing that accompanied the debt crisis.
6former, the drain of domestic resources lowers investment and generates demand for replacement
funds from the government and private sectors, which external creditors may be willing to supply
given the lower risks of heavy asset taxation they face. When external borrowing is fueled by capital
flight, residents deposit capital abroad, and the depositor obtains a loan from the same bank. This
"round-tripping" allows the domestic investor to arbitrage the yield and risk differential between
resident and external capital. '
Implications for an Empirical Portfolio Model of Flight Capital
To determine what special features relevant to the allocation of wealth to capital flight and domestic
investment should be added to a standard portfolio model, we will consider the theoretical models
together with the general empirical patterns of capital flight experienced largely in the 1970s and
1980s.
The general empirical evidence on country-by-country macroeconomic policy and capital flight
patterns  suggests that  pronounced  capital  flight  occurs  when  a  country  experiences  severe
macroeconomic imbalances (Schineller, (1997)) and the risks of punitive domestic asset taxation
increase rapidly. Many countries experienced episodes of large sudden changes in capital flows
which seem related to indications that policies were unsustainable. These very large  increases in
capital flight suggest that standard return differentials based on equilibrium relationships will not
account for the size of the capital movements, since asset retums will not adequately reflect the large
increase in policy oriented risks.
The standard portfolio model suggests two key incentives  for capital flight, after tax domestic returns
adjusted for expected depreciation that are lower than after tax foreign returns, and domestic returms
that have higher volatility or risk than foreign returns. Our first modification to the standard model
is the idea that the expected risk-adjusted relative returns will not be well captured by interest
differentials, actual tax rates, and expected depreciation based on actual depreciation of the official
exchange rate, as well as differential return volatilities. The theoretical models point out that one of
the most important determinants of the expected future asset tax rate is the level of foreign debt.
Expected depreciation may be better related to the degree of overvaluation of the real exchange rate.
Historical return volatilities may not be a good guide to expected  riskiness of domestic assets during
periods of severe policy and structural imbalances as well as political uncertainty. Below we discuss
empirical proxies that represent risk-adjusted return differentials in this broader fashion.
Second, the models above have pointed to the importance of contagion or spillovers in capital flight.
Empirically, these models imply that in the portfolio decision of an individual investor, the expected
after-tax returns on domestic investment would depend on the expected aggregate level of capital
flight (or alternatively the available domestic capital base subject to taxation). One implication for
aggregate capital flight portfolio shares is that the determinants of capital flight may have different
For the Philippines  Boyce (1992) finds evidence for both debt-fueled  capital flight and flight-fueled  external
borrowing.  Ajayi (1997) states  the no relation  between  debt and capital  flight  was found  for a sample  of sub-Saharan
African  countries,  although  the methodology  and  results  are not reported.
7effects when the capital flight share is small compared to when it is large. For example, a particular
expected tax rate may have jnly small effects on the incentive for capital flight when the share of
capital flight in aggregate portfolios is small. However, as capital flight increases, the same expected
tax rate could imply a much higher per capita expected tax liability given the lower domestic asset
tax base, and thus have a larger influence on capital flight. This reflects the spillover notion that as
capital flight increases, the incentives for further flight increase.
Third, foreign assets are much more liquid than domestic physical capital or claims on domestic
physical capital. A model that considered the liquidity of alternative assets would imply that return
differentials should be augmented by a liquidity premium. In addition, if domestic investment is
more irreversible, then continuing to hold foreign assets even when domestic returns have become
more favourable can be optimal due to the "option to wait" for future news about domestic returns.
Determinants of Flight Capital Portfolio Shares
In Section 2 we developed measures of private portfolio choice as of 1990 for 51 countries and
showed that at the regional level there were striking differences in choices. In Section 4 we will
attempt to explain these differences. In order to do so we first develop a framework for analysing
the choice between holding assets domestically and abroad. While such a framework may potentially
involve many considerations, our purpose is to test our approach through measurable proxies for the
theoretical concepts.  We therefore  limit the analysis to  those  factors which  are amenable to
measurement and include a discussion of empirical proxies for each concept. We consider factors
that influence our broad concept of rates of return and the risks associated with each asset..
T  he rate of return on foreign assets can be assumed to be the same for all asset holders, and so
relative returns differ only because of differences in domestic rates of return. The domestic private
rate of return upon capital, r, is assumed to be determined by four factors: the endowment capital
relative to labor, k, the rate of taxation of capital, t, anticipated changes in the real exchange rate, e,
and the policy environment, p, which determines the productivity of capital for a given capital-to-
labor ratio:
r=  r(k,t,e,p)  (1)
Although there are circumstances in which the return on capital will not decline in response to a rise
in the aggregate capital-labor ratio, it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that conditional upon the
policy environment it will do so. Recall from Table 1 that there are very large differences in the total
capital stock  (public plus private) per worker, between regions.  We would expect that, ceteris
paribus, this would imply that the rate of return on capital would be higher in the capital scarce
regions.  Of course, the lack of capital in a region may be partly or wholly the result of other
differences. In a world of fully mobile capital without risk, the rate of return on capital would be
equalized, and so differences in capital/labor ratios would be a reflection of underlying differences
in production functions (or other endowments).  However, the fully mobile capital model still utilizes
the assumption of diminishing returns to capital: capital is withdrawn from unproductive regions and
invested in productive regions until returns are equalized as a result of diminishing returns. To
8reduce the problem of endogeneity, we will measure the capital-labor ratio for each country as of
1980, using it to predict the portfolio choice ini199(. Most capital flight has occurred post-1980.
While the capital-labor ratio affects the overall return on capital, private portfolio decisions reflect
only private returns. The main divergence between social and private rates of return is due to
taxation. Because capital once installed is largely irreversible, owners of capital will be concerned
not just with current rates of taxation but with expected future tax liabilities. A good measure of
these an important part of these liabilities is the foreign indebtedness of the economy. We proxy this
by the ratio of foreign debt to GNP.
Domestic and foreign assets are denominated in different currencies. Hence, to the extent that
changes in the real exchange rate can be anticipated, the overall anticipated rate of return on foreign
assets will include currency appreciation or depreciation. Although in competitively determined
currency markets  information may be  used  efficiently, so that  exchange rate changes  cannot
systematically be predicted, in many developing countries official exchange rates have for periods
been considerably misaligned. During periods when the real exchange rate is overvalued private
agents have an incentive to move assets abroad, because they can anticipate depreciation in some
future period. We proxy this by the Dollar index of real exchange rate distortion (Dollar, 1992). The
Dollar index also proxies differences in the policy environment, since it seeks to measure not only
the extent to which the real exchange rate is misaligned, but the extent to which it is distorted by the
effects of trade policy restrictions. A high level of policy distortions will lower the return on
domestic investment through various routes. Hence, any effect of the index on portfolio choice
should be interpreted as a composite of the effect of anticipated changes in the exchange rate, and
of the effect of trade policy on the rate of return on investment. Similarly, the ratio of  foreign debt
to GNP will also partially proxy the policy environment. A high level of  foreign debt to GNP is
likely to reflect a history of poor use of public resources:  the ratio is high because of a lack of growth
In addition to the expected rate of return on an asset, wealth-holders must consider its implications
for portfolio risk, which is determined by the individual riskiness of the asset and its co-variance
with the rest of the portfolio. Foreign assets can be regarded as a relatively safe asset, the absolute
degree of risk being similar for all asset holders, while the co-variance with domestic assets is
usually low. Thus, the proportion of the portfolio held abroad,f  will depend upon both the return
on domestic assets relative to foreign assets, r, and on their riskiness relative to foreign assets, v:
f  =f(r, v)  (2)
A composite measure of the relative riskiness of domestic investment is the Institutional Investor
risk rating for a country. This is generated by a poll of informed banking opinion twice a year, and
is scaled 0-100 (0 being highest risk). Although the risk rating is a broad measure of country risk
geared toward foreign investment and sovereign lending, many of the factors considered influence
the climate for domestic investment. One factor which influences the risk ratings is indebtedness.
The Institutional Investor ratings and the ratio of debt to GNP have a correlation coefficient of 0.42.
An indicator which is sometimes discussed as an indicator of asset riskiness is corruption. A high
incidence of corruption may make legitimate assets vulnerable, and also corruptly acquired wealth
9may be more secure outside the country. We use the International Country Risk Guide measure of
corruption, averaged for the 1980s.
We have introduced the five observable explanatory variables, the capital-labor ratio, foreign debt,
the Dollar distortion  index, the Institutional Investor risk rating,  and the corruption  index as
individually  proxying the underlying analytic explanatory variables.  However, the  observable
variables are more properly interpreted as collectively proxying the risk-corrected rate of return on
domestic investment, rather than as individually proxying its components.
4. Results
Throughout we use two dependent variables, the proportion of private total wealth held abroad, and
the proportion of private real wealth held abroad. Both variables are measured as of 1990, this being
the most recent date for which all data is available. In principle, since private agents make their
portfolio choices by considering all their components of wealth, the dependent variable which most
closely approximates the decision problem of the private agent is flight capital as a proportion of
private total wealth. However, there are three reasons why the alternative measure of flight capital
as a proportion of private real wealth might be preferred. First, the only component  of private
financial wealth which can be measured on a comparable basis for a reasonable sample of countries
is quasi-money. The addition of this single component of fnancial wealth might result in an inferior
estimate of total private wealth than using the complete data on real private wealth as a proxy.
Secondly, demand for the two relatively illiquid assets, domestic real capital and flight capital, might
be more closely related than that for quasi-money. Thirdly, at the aggregate level of the real
economy, domestic private financial assets either directly net out or are claims on the government
which can only meet them by future taxation of the private sector. The only allocative decision at
the aggregate level is between domestic real capital and flight capital.
Full data on explanatory variables are available for 43 of the 51 countries for which we have data
on the dependent variables. The first explanatory variable is the endowment of capital per worker
(private plus public) as of 1980. Since most capital flight is post-1980, this considerably reduces
potential  endogeneity.  The  other  explanatory variables  are  the  Dollar  distortion  index,  the
Institutional Investor risk ratings, and the ratio of debt to GNP. For each of these we use the annual
average of the variable for the period 1980-89. One rationale for using the average over the decade
instead of the end-period value is that, because the costs of reversing investments are sometimes
high, the portfolio composition at any one time will reflect past decisions. Further, we argued above
that theoretical models point to the potential endogeniety of the foreign debt ratio, and ithat the
endogeneity of the real exchange rate distortion index should also be considered. By utilizing
previous period averages we reduce this problem of endogeneity.
The Institutional Investor risk ratings and the Debt/GNP ratio are more highly correlated than any
other variables. We therefore present regressions in which they are included separately as well as
jointly. When both are included only one is significant, but which of the two is dominant depends
upon the measure of the dependent variable.
10For twelve of the countries in the sample the measured stock of capital flight as of 1990 is zero. We
therefore utilised tobit models. We investigated non-linear relationships through the introduction of
squared terms and allowed for regional effects through dummies."  he results are reported for flight
capital as a proportion of private real wealth in Table 2A, and for flight capital as a proportion of
private total wealth in Table 2B. Overall, the two dependent variables reveal a very similar story,
although the fit is usually better for flight capital as a proportion of private real wealth. The addition
of quasi-money increases the importance of exchange rate over-valuation relative to investor risk,
which may reflect the greater liquidity of quasi-money. In the following discussion we focus upon
Table 2A. We regard our real wealth measure as a better proxy for total private wealth than that
generated by the inclusion of quasi-money,  and further,  our subsequent applications in Section 5 rely
upon the aggregate choice between domestic real private investment and flight capital. Overall, all
variables are usually significant with the expected sign and credibly sized coefficients, and the fit
of the regression is good.
The capital to labor ratio is significant at 2%. However, its effect is not very large. An addition of
$10,000 per worker, which  is a very large increase by the standards of developing countries,
increases the proportion of private wealth held abroad by only 8 percentage points.
The Dollar distortion index is significant at 1% and has a large effect. The index is constructed so
that a value of 100 represents a normal set of relative prices. We investigated whether values of the
index below this level had different effects from values above 100, but found no difference. Further,
the effect is best captured by the square of the index, suggesting that it is extreme over-valuations
which  are most damaging. For example, a change in the index from  100 to 200 increases the
proportion of the portfolio held abroad by a massive 26 percentage points. A value of 200 is high
but by no means the peak of the index: over the 150 countries for which the index has been
measured, the peak value is 406.
The Institutional Investor rating is significant at the 10% level in regression 1 but loses significance
once foreign debt is included. This may reflect  the importance of debt in assessments of country risk,
or that both debt and the risk ratings are measuring similar underlying country characteristics, such
as government  behavior.  In  regression  1, a  ten-point  improvement  in the  index reduces  the
proportion of the portfolio held abroad by 4.4 percentage points. A ten-point difference in the risk
ratings is within the feasible policy range for many countries. For example, it is approximately the
gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. A strongly reforming country such as Uganda
'Only that  for Latin  America  was  significant  and other  regional  dummies  were  dropped.  We also  dropped  the  corruption
index which was never significant.  Based on our discussion  of how liquidity  considerations  could affect portfolio
allocation,  we also investigated  whether financial  depth, measured  as the ratio of M2/GDP  was a determinant  of the
capital  flight share.  The variable  was not significant  in any of the specifications  and was dropped.
11Table 2A:  The Determinants  of Flight Capital/Private Real Wealth
------------------ Baseline  regressions------------------  --------------------------------------------------- Robustness checks-----------------------------------------------------
--------Based on Cline capital flight  measure--------  -------Based on Dooley capital flight  measure-------
Regression  1  Regression  2  Regression 1  Regression  2  Regression I  Regression 2
Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic
Capital/worker  0.000889  2.56  0.000866  2.68  0.0011  2.196  0.00102  2.27  0.00062  1.659  0.0006  1.69
1980
Dollar  Index  0.000878  3.87  0.000881  4.16  0.00103  3.398  0.00102  3.77  0.00084  3.469  0.00084  3.63
squared
Institutional  -0.497  -1.99  -0.286  -1.14  -0.76065  -2.004  -0.423  -1.17  -0.711  -2.582  -0.548  -1.93
Investor
Debt/GNP  0.000374  2.20  0.00046  2.15  0.00027  1.45
squared
Latin America  -26.701  -3.38  -26.184  -3.55  -24.49  -2.149  -23.7  -2.3  -20.08  -2.406  -19.8  -2.48
Constant  15.026  1.57  5.487  0.55  1.33  0.100  -10.87  0.137  20.97  2.043  -.13.86  1.255
Log-likelihood  -2.89  -0.60  -12.58  -10.46  -6.632  -5.612
N  43  43  43  43  43  43
12Table  2B: The Determinants  of Flight Capital/Total  Wealth
------------------ Baseline  regressions------------------  --------------------------------------------------- Robustness  checks.-----------------------------------------------------
--------Based on Cline capital  flight  measure--------  -------Based on Dooley capital flight  measure-------
Regression  1  Regression  2  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 1  Regression  2
Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic
Capital/worker  0.000863  2.96  0.000850  2.99  0.0010  2.33  0.00099  2.34  0.000617  1.91  0.000611  1.90
1980
Dollar  Index  0.000983  4.99  0.000946  4.88  0.0012  4.23  0.0011  4.16  0.000938  4.31  0.000919  4.22
squared
Institutional  -0.321  -1.47  -0.249  -1.12  -0.451  -1.33  -0.355  -1.04  -0.529  -2.12  -0.488  -1.91
Investor
Debt/GNP  0.000226  1.25  0.00241  0.98  0.000121  0.60
squared
Latin  America  -21.21  -3.25  -22.38  -3.41  -18.52  -1.86  -19.50  -1.99  -16.25  2.22  -16.64  -3.28
Constant  5.37  0.61  2.38  0.27  -10.93  -0.04  -13.99  -1.06  11.59  1.19  9.95  0.99
Log-likelihood  -2.19  -2.96  -9.49  -9.02  -2.92  -2.744
N  42  42  42  42  42  42
13was able to improve its risk rating by four points just during 1997. Were Africa to improve its risk
rating by ten points the change in portfolio choice would raise the private capital stock by 7.2%.
The ratio of  foreign debt to GNP is significant at the 5% level. However, the variable fits best as a
square of the ratio, and becomes economically important only at very high levels of indebtedness.
For example, at the level  of indebtedness agreed by the European Union for its  'convergence
criterion',  namely 60 %, debt only reduces the proportion of wealth held domestically by  1.4
percentage points  compared with a  debt-free economy. By contrast, moving from the highest
indebtedness found in the sample, 297%, to the level of 60%, would reduce the proportion of wealth
held abroad by 32 percentage points.
We now  consider  the robustness  of  the  results  to  two  different  measures  of capital  flight.
Specifically, we use the Cline method, which like our own uses a residual approach but  with
different assumptions, and the Dooley method, which seeks to measure the stock of privately held
foreign assets that do not generate income reported to the authorities. As shown in Table 2A, we
obtain similar results using these measures as we did with the World Bank estimates. On the Cline
measure the Institutional Investor ratings, while significant when the debt ratio is excluded, are
dominated by the debt ratio; on the Dooley measure, the ratings dominate the debt ratio. Recall that
the ratings and the debt ratio are highly correlated.
We now develop four applications of the regressions: the effect of the East Asian crisis on capital
flight; whether capital flight is subject to spillovers; the effect of the HPC  debt initiative on capital
repatriation; and why Africa has had so much capital flight.
5. Four Applications
The East Asian Crisis
Although capital outflows have obviously played a central role in the East Asian crisis, the focus to
date has been on the repatriation of short term foreign capital. Here we consider the response of
domestic portfolios. We show that in steady-state,  the domestic adjustment is likely to be larger than
the foreign adjustment.
The East Asian crisis has resulted in a sharp fall in investor confidence in some countries in the
region. We utilize the observed decline in the Institutional Investor risk ratings first between March
1997 and March 1998, and then between March and September 1998, to estimate the impact on the
reallocation of East Asian portfolios into capital flight. As with the HIPC effect, we are here using
a coefficient derived from a cross-section analysis to derive the consequence of an event. Since the
cross-section result tells us nothing about dynamics it can at best suggest the long-run effect of an
event. The results  should therefore be interpreted cautiously, as showing how portfolios might
eventually adjust were the changes in the risk ratings persistent.
Table 3 shows the estimated increase in capital flight for the four most severely affected East Asian
countries: Thailand, Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia. The first five rows show the deterioration in
14the Institutional Investor risk ratings. The main deterioration in the risk ratings occurred in the six
months subsequent to March 1998. The sixth row shows our estimate of private real wealth as of
1996, the most recent year for which an estimate is currently feasible. The final two rows show our
prediction of the increase in the capital flight component of portfolios. Between them the four
countries are predicted to experience a capital outflow of almost $250bn.
Table 3: Capital Flight in Response to the East Asian Crisis
Thailand  Korea  Malaysia  Indonesia
Risk Rating
March 1997  61.1  71.4  67.5  51.6
March 1998  52.3  64.4  64.5  49.9
September  1998  47.5  53.6  59.0  32.9
Change  Mar.97-Mar.98  -8.8  -7.0  -3.0  -1.7
Change  Mar.97-Sept.98  -13.6  -17.8  -8.5  -18.7
Private real wealth in 1996  639.4  1,093.3  357.6  993.8
($bn at current  prices)
Predicted change  in portfolios:
In $bn. At current  prices:
Mar.97.Mar.98  -28.0  -38.0  -5.3  -8.4
Mar.97-Sept.98  -43.2  -96.7  -15.1  -92.3
As % of 1996  GNP:
Mar.97-Mar.98  -15.5  -7.9  -5.6  -3.9
Mar.97-Sept.98  -23.9  -20.1  -16.0  -42.9
Notes:  Private wealth in our underlying  data set is calculated  as discussed  in Section 2 for 1990 and is
measured at 1985  prices. As in Table 5, we first convert  this to 1990  prices by multiplying  by 1.214,  the
increase  in the US CPI over the period.  We then  assume  that  the ratio of private  wealth  to GNP  was  the same
in 1996  as in 1990,  and so scale  up the 1990  private  wealth  figure  by GNP in 1996/GNP  in 1990.  The  effect
on private  portfolios  is then calculated  as the change  in the risk rating,  multiplied  by 0.00497  (the coefficient
on the risk rating in regression 1)  multiplied  by private  wealth in 1996.
Note that this is quite distinct from any flight of foreign-owned assets from the four countries. As
a proportion of GNP the largest loss would be borne by Indonesia, capital flight exceeding 40% of
GNP.
15The predicted steady-state domestic capital outflow of $250bn can be compared with the actual
reversal to date in total private capital flows, domestic plus foreign, which can be observed from
changes in the balance of payments. Between 1996 and 1998 what had been a large net iforeign
private capital inflow turned into a large net outflow, reflecting both capital repatriation by non-East
Asians, and capital outflows by East Asians. The total of this to date is around $100bn. Since we
only estimate capital outflows by East Asians, we are only predicting one component of the observed
total. However, the full $250bn predicted domestic portfolio adjustment might only take place over
several years.
Spillovers
One implication of contagion or spillovers in capital flight is that the determinants of capital flight
may have different effects when the predicted capital flight share is small compared to when it is
large. This hypotheses reflects the spillover notion that as capital flight increases, the incentives for
further capital flight increase. We can explore this notion using a quantile regression approach. By
calculating regressions for different quantiles, it is possible to examine the shape of the conditional
distribution of capital flight shares. Our particular interest is whether there are differences, in the
determinants of capital flight at the low and high end of the conditional distribution of capital flight
shares. Quantile regressions are defined by minimizing the absolute sum of the errors, rather than,
as in least squares, by minimizing the sum of their squares. It is thus also known as the LAD (Least
Absolute Deviations) estimator. Censored regression models such as the tobits we have been using
create additional complexities for estimating quantile regressions. We use Powell's (1984) censored
LAD estimator as implemented in Deaton (1997) and Buchinsky (1994).  Standard errors are
estimated using a bootstrap method.
Table 4 presents estimates of regression 1 at the 0.33 and 0.67 quantiles. Each of the coefficients is
larger in magnitude at the 0.67 quantile. In addition, the Dollar distortion index of the real exchange
rate and the risk rating are not significant in the 0.33 quantile regression. These results provicle  some
support for the spillovers hypothesis. At low quantiles in the conditional distribution of capital flight
shares, some proxies for risk-adjusted returns have either small or insignificant effects. However,
at a high quantile in the conditional distribution, these same factors have larger and  significant
effects. Factors that influence the expected risk and return on domestic assets have greater impact
when capital flight is high. This could be explained by spillovers in the sense of general bandwagon
effects as well as by spillovers induced by increasing expected per capita liabilities as capital flight
increases.
16Table 4: Quantile Regressions using Powell's censored LAD estimator
Regression 1  .33 Quantile  .67 Quantile
Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic
Capital/worker 1980  0.000873  1.91  0.000934  3.87
Dollar Index squared  0.000563  0.96  0.00125  2.50
Institutional Investor  -0.602  -.95  -0.717  -2.79
Latin America  -19.67  -2.67  -34.76  -3.71
Constant  13.72  0.46  26.11  2.01
PseudoR2 0.34  0.42
N  32  39
The HIPC Initiative
The new debt relief initiative of the IMF and the World Bank, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
arrangement, has the effect of lowering the foreign debt/GNP ratio for those countries which are
eligible. Currently, Uganda, Cote d'Lvoire, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mozambique and Bolivia have
passed the 'decision point', at which it is determined that the country has met the eligibility criteria,
although only Uganda has passed the 'completion point',  at which debt is actually reduced. The
debt/GNP ratio will decline for these countries, although by widely varying amounts. Table 5 shows
the effect upon private portfolios, applying the debt coefficient from Table 2A. We convert this into
an estimated dollar amount commensurate with the 1996 debt and GNP figures used by assuming
that the ratio of private wealth/GNP observed for 1990 also applied in 1996. Thus, for example, for
Guyana, debt forgiveness under HIPC is estimated to reduce indebtedness by 25%. We estimate that
the effect of this would be to reduce the proportion of Guyanese private wealth held abroad by 10.1
percentage  points.  On these  assumptions,  Guyanese  private  wealth  holders  would  repatriate
$610.1m.  Since the NPV ofthe debt reduction is only $253m, in this instance each dollar of public
funds is augmented by $2.41 of repatriated private funds.  Debt relief to Guyana has such a high
gearing because Guyana  is very highly indebted, while the marginal efficiency of debt relief
increases with indebtedness, and because it has a high level of private wealth relative to GDP. By
contrast, Burkina Faso and Uganda have far lower gearing because both the above factors work
against them.
17Table  5: The Effect  of the HIPC  Debt  Relief Initiative  on Portfolio  Choice
1996  HIPC Reduction  Portfolio Change  NPV of debt
Debt/GNP  (% points)  (% points)  ($m)  reduction ($m)  Gearing
Uganda  60.5  12.1  0.50  29.0  347  0.08
Burkina Faso  51.2  7.2  0.26  7.9  115  0.07
Guyana  246.0  61.5  10.10  610.1  253  2.41
Cote d'Ivoire  201.3  12.1  1.80  297.3  345  0.86
Mozambique  378.6  215.8  44.40  3,103.8  1,442  2.1]5
Bolivia  80.9  9.4  0.54  - 448
Notes:  Debt/GDP  for 1996 from Global Development  Finance, World Bank, Table A1.4. The HIPC
Reduction  is the percentage  reduce  in the  net present  value  of debt  at the 'completion  point' after  full
use of traditional  debt relief mechanisms,  as estimated  by the IMF. Because  HIPC meets a flow of
debt service  obligations,  its impact  on indebtedness  is best calculated  by the reduction  in the NPV
of debt rather than as a face value. The Portfolio  Change  in percentage  points is 0.00087 [column
1 squared  - ((column  1 - column  2) squared).  Note that we thus assume  that the (notional)  nominal
indebtedness  declines  proportionately  with the NPV  of debt.  The  dollar  value  of the portfolio  change
is calculated  as the change in percentage  points times estimated  private wealth  in 1996. The latter
is the 1990  value at 1985  prices,  estimated  as in Table 1, multiplied  by 1.214  (the increase  in the US
CPI)  to convert  into 1990  prices,  multiplied  by 1  + the growth  in nominal  dollar  GNP,  1990-96,  from
Global  Development  Finance,  1998. Bolivia  is not part  of our data set for Table 1 and so the dollar
value of the portfolio  change  cannot  be estimated.
Why has Africa had so much capitalflight?
The most remarkable result of the study is that Africa has such a high level of private capital held
abroad, namely 39%. We now utilize the regression results to explain this phenomenon. First, when
an Africa dummy variable is introduced into the regression it is neither large nor significant. Hence,
between then the variables included in the regressions fully account for this exodus of private capital.
In Table 6 we decompose African capital flight into its causes by explaining the difference between
African and East Asian portfolio choices: why have East Asians placed a much smaller proportion
of their wealth abroad than Africans?
18Table 6:  Africa and East Asia Compared
Variable  Africa  E. Asia  ---  Coefficients--------  Differences  (Africa
Mean  Mean  Regression  1  Regression  2  minus  E. Asia)
Capital/worker  1980  4338  7614  0.00082  0.0008  -2.69  -2.62
Dollar Index squared  23189.9  6990.9  0.00087  0.00087  14.093  14.093
Institutional  Investor  22.4  51.5  -0.44  -0.23  12.804  6.693
Debt/GNP  squared  13989.7  2818.7  0.00038  4.245
Capital  flight share  42.0  6.1
Total explained  difference  24.2  22.4
Actual difference  35.9  35.9
Residual  11.7  13.5
Total explained  difference  as a % of actual  difference  67.4%  62.4%
Note:  The means used in Table 6 are for the regression sample which, as reported in the appendix, is
smaller than that used for Table 1. Means of capital per worker and capital flight are calculated on
the same basis as in Table 1.
The first explanatory variable, the endowment of capital per worker, actually deepens the puzzle. As
shown in Table 1, Africa has a far lower capital endowment than East Asia and the regressions find
that, other things equal, capital scarcity reduces capital flight. East Asia has had little capital flight
despite being relatively well-endowed with capital, whereas Africa has had massive capital flight
despite being poorly endowed. Both regressions imply that the difference in capital endowments
would have induced Africans to hold domestically three more percentage points of their portfolios
than East Asians. Hence, that Africa has such a high proportion of its wealth abroad despite being
capital-scarce, is an indicator of how much effect the other variables have had.
African real exchange rates have been substantially over-valued relative to East Asian exchange
rates. The average value of the Dollar index in the African sample was 140 as against 83 for the East
Asian sample. Recall that the effect of exchange rate over-valuation is non-linear, being determined
by the square of the index rather than by its level. Hence, the mean values of 140 and 83 convert into
squared values of 19,572 against 6,885. However, even this understates the effect on portfolio choice
because some African countries have had extremely overvalued exchange rates. As a result, the
difference  between  the means  of the squares  of the index, which  is what matters  for the regression,
is even greater than that between  the square of the means.  The mean  of the squares  of the index was
3.32 times greater in Africa than Asia, whereas the square of the mean is only 2.84 times greater.
Both regressions imply that this large difference would have induced Africans to hold domestically
fourteen less percentage points of their portfolios than East Asians.
19Africa has been rated by international investors as the riskiest continent. The average value of the
Institutional Investor index was only 22 for Africa versus 52 for East Asia. Recent events in East
Asia suggest that these ratings might not have been accurate predictors of actual risks. Haque et al.
(1999) show that although the ratings are explicable on economic fundamentals, there is a large and
significant Africa dummy: Africa is regarded as more risky than is warranted by the fundamentals.
The effect of this difference in risk ratings between Africa and East Asia on portfolio choice has
been substantial. The regressions imply that they have increased African capital flight relative to East
Asian by between 6 and 12 percentage points of private portfolios.
Africa has been much more heavily indebted than East Asia: on average, debt/GNP was 95% in the
African sample and only 51% in East Asia. However, as with exchange rate over-valuation, even this
difference understates the effect upon portfolio choice because it is the square rather than the level
of the variable which is important. While the average African country has been heavily indebted,
some countries have been extremely heavily indebted. Hence, the mean of the squares is 4.96 times
greater than East Asia, whereas the square of the mean is only 3.45 times greater. The regression
with debt included implies that this has increased African capital flight relative to East Asian by four
percentage points of private portfolios.
6.  Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to set flight capital in the context of a portfolio choice, focusing on
the proportion of private wealth which is held abroad. For 51 countries as of 1990 we were able to
construct estimates of private domestically held capital on a comparable basis, and estimates of the
stock of capital flight. The sum of these two stocks yields private real wealth, of which the stock of
flight capital is then expressed as a proportion. We found that there were large regional variations
in the proportion of the portfolio held abroad, with the highest proportion being for Sub-Saharan
Africa, where 39% of private wealth was abroad. By contrast, East Asia had only 6% of its private
wealth abroad.
Next, we attempted to explain these differences. We first set out a simple framework for portfolio
choice based upon the rate of return on domestic assets and their riskiness relative to foreign assets.
We then proposed measurable proxies for the variables used in the theory and tested it on the data
set. Other things equal, the higher is the endowment of capital per worker the higher is capital flight.
Exchange rate over-valuation, foreign indebtedness, and investor risk all increase the proportion of
the portfolio held abroad. Next, we applied the results to four questions. First, we used the estimated
effect of the risk ratings to calculate the effect of their deterioration in response to the East Asian
crisis  on East Asian portfolios. We estimated that the four most  severely effected East Asian
countries would eventually lose around $250bn of domestic wealth as a result of the deterioration
in risk between March 1997 and September 1998. Second, we considered whether the results were
consistent with a spillover model and found some support for it. Thirdly, we used the estimated
effect of  foreign debt to calculate the effect of the HIPC debt relief initiative on capital repatriation.
We find that the effect will vary massively between HIPC-eligible countries. Finally, we considered
why Africa has had so much capital flight. Since Africa has by far the lowest capital per worker, this
makes its high capital flight all the more distinctive. However, an African dummy added to the
20regression is insignificant. Three variables explained African capital flight: exchange rate over-
valuation, adverse investor risk ratings, and high indebtedness. We decomposed the large difference
in capital flight between Africa and East Asia into these components.
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23Appendix A: Simple Portfolio Model of Capital Flight from Sheets (1995)
Consider and agent who maximizes a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
U (Wt,  a ').  The agent invests a share of wealth a in the domestic asset which has expected
return r and variance a  , and share (l-a) in the foreign asset which has expected return  and
variance  Cyf  . Covariance between the two assets is G12.
End of period wealth is:
W,  =  (a(l+r)  + (l-a)(l+r  ))W,
The variance of the portfolio is:
a2  =  (Ga 2 +  OC  )2  +  2cc(l-cxa)U 2 )
The agent's optimization problem can be solved to yield the demand function for the domestic
asset:
Di  =  G f  - (Y12  +  r - rf  )W
2  0  PY2
where 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Demand for the home asset increases linearly
with wealth, decreases with risk aversion, and increases as with the differential between the
domestic interest and world interest rate.
If the expected return and variance of the domestic asset were equal to that of the foreign asset,
the agent would diversify her portfolio, and hold half of wealth in each asset, D, . When the
expected returns and variances of the assets differ, we can express the home asset as follows
(using a first-order Taylor expansion around the foreign expected return and variance):
D,,  ~  D, t  +  ,  ]  tr  r-f )1  (2  s2  )
iiji  Yf  Jf~  ;~  - 9o12 2
24This expression highlights two channels which reduce demand for the home asset and increase
demand for the foreign asset. These are the types of factors that lead to capital flight. First, in the
text we discuss how conditions of macroeconomic and political instability increase the riskiness
of investing domestically relative to holding foreign assets. In the expression above, these effects
operate through the third term. Secondly, we discuss the explicit and implicit asset taxes imposed
by governments that lower the expected domestic return relative to the foreign return. These
effects operate through the second term.
25Data Appendix
Sample for Table 1:
SSA  LAC  SASIA  EASIA  MENA
Benin  Costa Rica  Bangladesh  Indonesia  Egypt
Burkina Faso  Dominican Rep  India  S Korea  Tunisia
Burundi  El Salvador  Pakistan  Malaysia  Syria
Cameroon  Guatemala  Sri Lanka  Philippines


















26Sample for Table 2 (Regressions):
SSA  LAC  SASIA  EASIA  MIENA  other
Cameroon  Costa Rica  Bangladesh  Indonesia  Egypt  Portugal
Congo  Domin. Rep  India  South Korea  Tunisia  Turkey
Gabon  El Salvador  Pakistan  Malaysia  Syria
Ivory Coast  Guatemala  Sri Lanka  Philippines













Following  King and Levine  (1994) we estimate an initial capital stock and use the perpetual
inventory method to compute our capital stock measure.
Based on a neo-classical growth model we compute estimates for the initial capital stock. The capital
stock, K, changes due to gross investment, I, and depreciation
dK, = It -6 K,  (i)
where 5 is the depreciation rate. Assuming that the economy is in steady-state the capital-output
ratio, K=K/Y, is constant and output, Y, and capital grow at the same rate, y,.
27dK,  dY, =  *  (ii)
K,  Yt
Dividing  (i) by KI  we can write
Yt  =--  a
riKt
Denoting  the investment  rate,  I/Y, by i we can write  the steady-state  capital  output  ratio for country
j as
*  - ij
Kj  (6 + Y;)
The initial capital  stock for country  j is given  by
Ko= k,  YO
We estimate  the initial capital  stock by assuming  that the depreciation  rate, 6, is constant across
countries  and time. Like King and Levine (1994)  we assume  that the capital  stock depreciiates  by
seven percent per year. The country's steady state growth  rate, y*j,  is a weighted  average of the
country's and the world's growth  rates
r;=  rj+ (1-A) r
where  X equals 0.25. Choosing  1960 as the initial year, yj  is country  j's  average  growth  rate from
1960-69  and  yw  is the world growth  rate  over  the last thirty  years  (y,=O0.04).  Using  PWT 5.6 data  we
calculate  the average  investment  ratio 1960-69,  i* , and given  yj  and 6 we can compute  the capital-
output  ratio,  K j. Taking  the average  of the PWT  5.6 output  data  over 1960-62  we estimate  the initial
output and calculate  the initial capital  stock.
28Annual values for the capital stocks are obtained by applying the perpetual inventory method:
K+  = X  (1-a  )k It-k  + (1-  Ko
k=O
Investment as well as workforce data from PWT 5.6 were used to obtain the capital stock per worker
estimates.
Independent Variables
Dollar's  (1992) Distortion Index
Dollar constructs a distortion index which measures to which extent the real exchange rate is
distorted from its free-trade level. The distortion index is constructed in three steps. First, using data
from PWT 5.6 the index of a country's relative price level (RPL) is determined
RPL =100* e  Pi
Pus
where e is the nominal exchange rate and Pi is the consumption price index for country i. The United
States' price level, PUS,  is used as the benchmark. RPL is similar to the usual measure of the real
exchange rate, except that here the price indices employed have the same weights in each country.
The second step is the correction  of RPL for different endowments  across countries. The main proxy
for endowments is GDP per capita and RPL is regressed on GDP per capita. The partial correlation
between RPL and GDP is positive and significant,  this result is robust to different specifications. To
obtain the index of price distortion, actual and fitted values are compared. Actual values for Sub-
Saharan Africa and for Latin America tend to be higher than the fitted values, i.e. their price levels
are higher than predicted by their GDP. Thus, these countries have had higher prices due to trade
restrictions. A number of South East Asian countries on the other hand have price levels which are
below their predicted price level.
Finally, the index of real exchange rate distortion is obtained by dividing the actual price level by
the predicted price level (and multiplied by 100).
Institutional Investor Risk Rating
The Institutional Investor risk ratings are based on evaluations from the staff of approximately the
largest 100 commercial banks. The banks rate countries on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing
the highest risk. The Institutional Investor ratings for particular countries are obtained by weighting
29the bank responses giving more weight to banks with larger international risk exposure and more
sophisticated risk-analysis system. While primarily designed to evaluate sovereign risk, a poor
sovereign risk environment is likely to be very highly correlated with a risky environment for
domestic investment.
Debt/GNP
Debt/GNP ratio was obtained from World Bank World Data CD ROM 1994. It is the ratio of total
external debt to GNP.  Both components are measured in current US Dollars.
Capital/Labor Ratio
The capital  stock per  worker was obtained by  dividing our capital  stock measure  (compiled
following King and Levine, 1994) by the number of workers which we obtained from PWT 5.6.
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